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Conflicts over important moral differences can divide communities and
trap people in destructive spirals of enmity that become intractable. But
these conflicts can also be managed constructively. Two laboratory stud-
ies investigating the underlying social–psychological dynamics of more
tractable versus intractable moral conflicts are presented, which tested a
core proposition derived from a dynamical systems theory of intractable
conflict. It portrays more intractable conflicts as those, which have lost
the complexity inherent to more constructive social relations and have
collapsed into overly simplified, closed patterns of thinking, feeling, and
acting that resist change. Employing our Difficult Conversations Lab
paradigm in which participants engage in genuine discussions over moral
differences, we found that higher levels of cognitive, emotional, and
behavioral complexity were associated with more tractable conversations.
Whereas in a pilot study we examined conflicts that naturally became
more/less intractable, in our main experiment, high versus low levels of
cognitive complexity were induced.
Today, the USA and much of the globe are seeing unprecedented levels of political, moral, and cultural polar-
ization, leading to spikes in violence and hate crimes among citizens, governmental dysfunction, and an inca-
pacity to respond effectively to shared national and international threats such as pandemics, climate change,
and economic meltdowns. Although the research on addressing protracted conflict and polarization is exten-
sive, our understanding of their causes and remedies remains fragmented and piecemeal. This article presents
two empirical studies that test a basic proposition from a new dynamical systems theory of intractable conflict,
which offers an integrative platform for comprehending their basic underlying psychological dynamics and pre-
sent innovative methods for investigating them in a controlled setting The Difficult Conversations Lab.
In December 1994, John C. Salvi III walked into two women’s clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts, shot
and killed two women at point-blank range and wounded five others. In what was one of the most trau-
matic events of the Pro-Life/Pro-Choice conflict in the USA, Salvi reportedly pronounced to one of the
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dying women: “That’s what you get. You should pray the rosary” (Butterfield, 1996, February 15, p. 1).
This is the vile side of social conflict.
Of course, not all conflicts go so horribly wrong. In fact, the majority of conflicts in our lives are either
ignored and fleeting or constructively managed. However, the example demonstrates that conflicts over
important moral differences have the potential to become highly destructive and intractable (Pearce &
Littlejohn, 1997). Intractable conflicts are defined as those that are more enduring, destructive, pervasive,
and resistant to resolution (Bar-Tal, 2007; Coleman, 2003, 2006; Fiol, Pratt, & O’Connor, 2009; Kries-
berg, 2005; Maiese, 2006; Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006). These toxic dynamics can divide commu-
nities and trap people in painful, costly spirals of negativity, contempt, and even violence (Coleman,
2003, 2006). Their intransigence has motivated scholars to better understand the differences between
more and less intractable conflicts in order to identify ways to prevent them and mitigate their harm.
While decades of research have contributed to understanding the many factors associated with
intractability over moral issues (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bartoli, Bui-Wrzosinska & Nowak, 2010; Coleman, 2003;
Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2005; Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Harinck & Druckman, 2017; Kriesberg, 2005;
Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 1989), the field remains fragmented in its understanding of the basic
individual-level psychological dynamics underlying such conflicts and their constructive management
(Coleman, 2003; Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010; Vallacher et al., 2013).
In this paper, we present two laboratory studies that test the theoretical proposition that intractable
conflicts are those which have lost the complexity characteristic of more constructive social relations, evi-
dencing more simplified and closed patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting (Coleman, Vallacher,
Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007; Vallacher et al., 2010). Both studies employed a new paradigm—the
Difficult Conversations Lab (DCL)—for investigating potentially intractable moral conflicts. The para-
digm allows for the assessment of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors over the course of a conflictual
discussion—or as influenced by the conflict—and employs innovative methods such as computer-based
mouse-coding (Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994) instead of standardized scales.
Complexity and Conflict
Conflicts—which exist whenever incompatible activities occur—can differ on many dimensions, includ-
ing their levels of destructiveness and endurance (Coleman, 2018; Deutsch, 1973). Some disputes are
straightforward, with low levels of destructiveness and respond readily to good faith attempts to work
them out. Others may be more complicated, involving various disputants and issues that are more deeply
rooted and so persist longer. Nevertheless, they are still manageable with good intentions, skill, persis-
tence, and a modicum of luck. However, a small percentage of the more difficult conflicts we face are
highly volatile and often deeply interwoven with important aspects of identity, morality, and worldview
—where the dynamics between the disputants eventually become highly destructive and durable. These
conflicts tend to cause great misery, resist good faith attempts at resolution, and come to seem intract-
able (Bar-Tal, 2013; Coleman, 2003, 2011, 2014; Kriesberg, 2005).
But how do some disputes become trapped in such intransigence? We suggest that one answer may lie
in the complexity of the disputants’ underlying psychological dynamics. Whereas many moral conflicts
are “objectively” complex in nature, individuals’ perceptions and experiences of these conflicts can differ
in their degree of complexity, ranging from more simplistic, black-and-white views of the issues and the
people involved to highly nuanced, multidimensional views and experiences (Satish, 1997; Schroder,
1978; Streufert & Streufert, 1978).
Decades of research has documented the critical importance of higher levels of psychosocial complex-
ity to constructive conflict processes and outcomes, including studies on conflict and cognition (Golec,
2002; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Peng & Nisbett, 1999), social perception (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007;
Quattrone, 1986), social identity (Peterson & Flanders, 2002; Roccas & Brewer, 2002), emotion (Averill,
1983; Gottman, Murray et al, 2002), communication (Conway, Suedfeld, & Tetlock, 2001; Tetlock, 1985;
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Tetlock, 1988), creativity, and innovation (Salazar, 2002), and social structures (LeVine & Campbell,
1972; Varshney, 2002). A recent theoretical model connects these varied strands of research and postu-
lates differences in the basic underlying dynamics of intractable versus more manageable social conflict
(Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007; Vallacher et al., 2010; Vallacher, Coleman,
Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2011).
The model portrays intractable conflicts as those, which have lost the complexity inherent to more
constructive social relations, evidencing more simplified, coherent, closed patterns of thinking, feeling,
and acting which therefore become resistant to change. It employs insights from dynamical social psy-
chology (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998; Vallacher et al., 1994; Vallacher & Nowak, 2007) to conceptualize
basic patterns that emerge over time, which result in more conformity and resistance to change. In other
words, the model suggests that there are qualitatively different patterns of underlying psychosocial
dynamics—the cognitions, emotions, and behaviors that people experience and evidence during a con-
flict—that lead to more tractable versus intractable conflicts. This view provides an integrative platform
for conceptualizing (prior) research on complexity and conflict in terms of one basic mechanism: a col-
lapse of complexity.
To illustrate, most relationships in which conflicts emerge are characterized by compatibilities and
incompatibilities with respect to various issues and will therefore be multidimensional and nuanced
(Katz & Kahn, 1978; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Schelling, 1960). Think of disputes that arise between you
and your family, friends, or coworkers. These tend to be more nuanced relationships with many different
moments, issues, and points of contention. The complexity of such relationships offers room for trade-
offs and complementary solutions, which address the needs of all parties. Conflict resolution in these
instances is similar to problem-solving where both parties are open to exchanges and attempts to find
solutions that best address their respective concerns (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Fisher, Ury, & Pat-
ton, 1991; Johnson, Johnson, & Tjosvold, 2006). The pattern of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors in
these situations would therefore evidence higher levels of complexity.
In contrast, intractable conflicts are those in which, paradoxically, the conflict itself becomes increas-
ingly more complex (involving new issues, circumstances, and disputants over time), but disputants’ per-
ceptions and experiences of the conflict become steadily more simplistic (us vs. them, good vs. evil),
stable, and resistant to attempts at resolution. Think of the current tensions between Always-Trumpers
and Never-Trumpers in the USA. Over time, both sides have become more certain, steadfast, and sim-
plistic in their views on the issues and the people involved. This oversimplification is then further fueled
when information that is new or contradictory is ignored or otherwise not processed (cf. Coleman et al.,
2007; Suedfeld, 2010; Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013). Conflicts displaying these dynamics begin to evidence
more simplified, coherent, and stable patterns for thinking, feeling, and action.
In sum, the dynamical system model of intractability suggests that a basic underlying difference
between conflicts with more tractable versus more intractable outcomes is that the latter collapse into
over-simplified, closed patterns of experience and action, while more tractable conflicts remain more
nuanced and open to new information and change. This leads to our basic proposition: Differences in
the levels of complexity in the underlying dynamics of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors of disputants
are associated with different conflict outcomes; more complex dynamics are associated with more tract-
able outcomes, while more simple and constrained dynamics are associated with more intractable out-
comes.
The work on the dynamical model of intractable conflict to date has been largely theoretical, even
metaphorical (cf. Coleman et al., 2007; Vallacher et al., 2010). In the current studies, we empirically test
a set of parameters gleaned from various strands of research suitable to measuring the dynamics of
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral complexity of disputants engaged in a potentially intractable moral
conflict.
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Research Parameters for Assessing Complexity in Potentially Intractable
Moral Conflict
Having laid the conceptual groundwork for our main proposition, the next step was to specify the
parameters and hypotheses to operationalize and empirically test the proposition.
First, for our studies in which two disagreeing individuals discussed a moral topic, we operationalized
tractable versus intractable conflicts in terms of the outcomes of each of the conversations. Tractable con-
flicts were those in which participants were able to generate a joint position statement, which evidenced
a common understanding of the issue and an advanced level of reasoning, indicative of a conflict that is
likely to be resolved (Golec, 2002; Rosenberg, 1988). Intractable conflicts were those in which partici-
pants were unable to generate a joint position statement or produced one that showed a poor level of rea-
soning, indicative of a conflict resistant to resolution. We note that this operationalization of
(in)tractability is rather narrow (focusing solely on the aspect “resistance to resolution”), a compromise
we made in order to conduct a laboratory study. Accordingly, we refer to (in)tractable outcomes hence-
forth.
To assess the complexity of psychological dynamics underlying moral conflicts, we employed concepts
used previously to measure differences in the complexity of cognitive processing, emotional experiences,
and behavioral interactions—three basic attitudinal components (Breckler, 1984; Hilgard, 1980), which
have been found to be directly implicated in more intractable conflict dynamics (Coleman, 2003).
Second, to conceptualize and operationalize cognitive complexity, we employed the concept of integra-
tive complexity (Suedfeld et al., 1992), a concept and measure of the degree to which cognitive processing
involves recognizing multiple perspectives and possibilities and integrating them into a coherent view. In
other words, it is a measure of the degree to which a complex problem is first differentiated, or analyzed
into its component parts and then integrated or synthesized into an understanding that incorporates the
interrelations of its parts (c.f. Baker-Brown et al., 1992; Suedfeld et al., 1992). Individuals in a state of
higher integrative complexity tend to both differentiate issues—comprehend them from different points
of view—and integrate this information into a coherent, global level of understanding. In contrast, lower
levels of integrative complexity represent states of dichotomous, black-and-white thinking, in which con-
tradictions and ambiguities are ignored.
Research has repeatedly shown that lower in comparison with higher levels of integrative complexity
are associated with increases in conflict escalation (Suedfeld & Leighton, 2002; Tetlock, 1985), aggressive
acts (Satterfield, 1998), competitive strategies (Kugler & Brodbeck, 2014; Walker & Watson, 1994), ten-
sion and stress (Suedfeld, 1992; Wallace, Suedfeld, & Thachuk, 1993), violence (Suedfeld, Tetlock, &
Ramirez, 1977), and international crises (Ballard, 1983; Suedfeld & Bluck, 1988; Suedfeld, Wallace, &
Thachuk, 1993). In contrast, higher levels of integrative complexity have been shown to be related to
more cooperative agreements, peaceful resolutions (Koo, Han, & Kim, 2002; Liht, Suedfeld, & Krawczyk,
2005; Winter, 2007) and constructive inter- and intra-group processes (Brodbeck, Kugler, Fischer,
Heinze, & Fischer, 2020; Park & DeShon, 2018).
Hypothesis 1. In conflicts over moral differences, higher levels of integrative complexity are associated
with more tractable conflict outcomes than lower levels of integrative complexity, which are associated
with more intractable outcomes.
Third, emotional complexity has been defined and measured as differences in people’s experiences in
the co-activation of opposing emotions (Berrios, 2019; Kang & Shaver, 2004; Rees, Rothman, Lehavy, &
Sanchez-Burks, 2013). Following the work of Gottman et al. (2002), we investigated differences in the ra-
tios between negative and positive emotional experiences during conflict. This approach is based on the
broaden-and-build model (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001, 2013), which suggests that positive emotions
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broaden people´s momentary thought-action repertoire, whereas negative emotions narrow it. Although
negative emotions are adaptive in threatening situations requiring quick actions, positive emotions are
less prescriptive, giving room for varying responses.
Previous research has identified the importance of higher ratios of positivity-to-negativity in predict-
ing resilience in social relations (Carrere, Buehlmann, Gottman, Coan, & Ruckstuhl, 2000; Gottman,
1993; Gottman, Swanson, & Swanson, 2002b; Lewis, 2005; Losada & Heaphy, 2004). Positive and nega-
tive emotions are thought to build-up incrementally over time, affecting how specific encounters are
experienced and interpreted (Gottman, 1993; Gottman, Murray et al., 2002).
Given the likelihood of negative emotions during discussions of difficult moral conflicts (Coleman,
Goldman, & Kugler, 2009), it has been found to be necessary to have a sufficiently high level of positivity
to buffer the deleterious effects of negative emotions in order to allow sufficient openness to the other
party to learn and improve relations (Gottman, Murray et al., 2002). Therefore, we suggest that, espe-
cially in difficult moral conflicts, a higher ratio of positive-to-negative emotions is beneficial and likely to
be associated with more tractable conflict outcomes.
Hypothesis 2. In conflicts over moral differences, higher positive-to-negative emotional ratios are
associated with more tractable conflict outcomes than lower levels of these ratios, which are associated
with more intractable outcomes.
Fourth, we investigated differences in the levels of behavioral complexity during moral conflicts or the
array of competing behaviors that the participants displayed (Lawrence, Lenk, & Quinn, 2009). Specifi-
cally, we focused on the competing behaviors of inquiry versus advocacy while engaging in conflict.
Inquiry refers to the act of asking questions that explore the other’s positions and needs in conflict,
whereas advocacy describes the act of stating or defending one’s own positions and needs (Losada, 1999;
Losada & Heaphy, 2004; Senge, 1990, 1993). Whereas advocating for one’s own point of view is a domi-
nant behavior in many conflict situations, inquiry is especially crucial to learn about the other’s point of
view in order to incorporate different perspective into a more complex understanding of the issue (Sued-
feld, 1992), or to find common ground (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Senge, 1993). In research on work teams,
Losada found that inquiry actions acted as a counterweight to advocacy and were associated with more
effective action and team performance (Losada, 1999; Losada & Heaphy, 2004). In the current research,
we examined how ratios of inquiry-to-advocacy behaviors related to more and less tractable conflict out-
comes.
Hypothesis 3. In conflicts over moral differences, higher levels of inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral
ratios are associated with more tractable conflict outcomes than lower levels of these ratios, which are
associated with more intractable outcomes.
The Difficult Conversations Lab (DCL)
In order to systematically study genuine moral conflicts in the laboratory that have a high potential to
become intractable, we established the Difficult Conversations Lab (DCL) paradigm. The DCL is mod-
eled after John Gottman’s Love Lab (Gottman, 2020), which studies the dynamics of marital conflict. In
the DCL, we invited two individuals to discuss and reach consensus on a potentially polarizing moral
topic (e.g., abortion or euthanasia) on which the two individuals disagreed. Moral conflicts are typically
based on incommensurate worldviews of complex issues and are hence hard to resolve and potentially
lead to intractable outcomes (Coleman, 2003; Fiol et al., 2009; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997). Consensus
could be demonstrated by jointly generating a position statement on which both individuals agreed and
with which they both felt sufficiently comfortable. A more advanced position statement (defined below)
was employed as a proxy for more tractable conflict outcomes, no written statement or a poorly reasoned
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statement was a proxy for more intractable conflict outcomes. Given that moral differences were dis-
cussed in the laboratory, we were able to assess cognitions directly affected by the discussions as well as
the moment-to-moment emotional experiences and behaviors (i.e., underlying psychological dynamics)
as they developed and resulted in more tractable versus intractable outcomes. Thus, we based our analy-
ses on coding of actual ongoing conversations and written statements (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Gottman
et al., 2002; Gottman et al., 1999; Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008).
General Procedure
First, participants received an online-questionnaire assessing their opinions on a diverse set of sociopolit-
ical topics (different topics were required to simplify the matching of individuals into oppositional dyads
and to assure that participants would come to the session not expecting to talk about a specific topic).
About one week later, we invited two participants at a time to a 1.5-hr laboratory session; the two partic-
ipants held opposing views about one topic, which was to be discussed during the laboratory session
(they were initially unaware of each other’s views on the topic).
During the laboratory session, each dyad discussed a moral issue on which they disagreed for approxi-
mately 20 min and tried to reach consensus by writing a joint position statement on which they both
agreed and with which they felt comfortable. They were informed that the statement was to be shared
anonymously with a “Dialogue Forum of [the University]”. The presence or absence of a position state-
ment as well as the statements’ level of political reasoning (Golec, 2002; Rosenberg, 1988) was used to
assess whether conflicts turned out to be more or less (in)tractable. The discussion was audio-recorded
and a facilitator was present, who did not intervene or speak unless necessary (it was not necessary in
any of the discussions).
After the discussion, participants individually responded to a short questionnaire including an open-
ended question assessing their momentary level of integrative complexity as affected by the discussion.
(Note that we also included several scales for exploratory purposes addressing participants’ experiences
during the discussion; the items are not considered in this paper, but will be shared upon request; a sam-
ple items is: “How fair was the conversation?”). Next, participants listened to the audio recording of the
discussion and coded their moment-to-moment emotional experiences during the discussion. Finally,
participants were debriefed. Later on, trained coders listened to the audio recordings and coded partici-
pants’ utterances with respect to inquiry and advocacy.
Measures
We assessed participants’ opinions on the moral issues using scales from opinion poll research (details on
the scales are provided in each of the studies’ methods sections). Three additional questions addressed
participants’ concerns for the topics (e.g., “How concerned are you about the issue of [moral issue]?”).
Conflict outcomes were assessed based on the jointly generated position statements. First, we consid-
ered whether or not participants managed to complete a joint position statement. Second, the quality of
the statements they composed was assessed by coding their level of developmental advancement in politi-
cal reasoning using the framework by Rosenberg (1988) and the coding manual by Golec (2002). Rosen-
berg defines a developmental sequence in political reasoning with 5 levels: On Level 1 (i.e., sequential
level), political reasoning happens in concrete terms based on tangible aspects of observed reality without
generalizing beyond the here and now and without understanding what unites or divides political groups
in abstract, ideological terms. Level 3 (i.e., linear level) includes simple generalizations and abstractions
as well as rules to establish categories and causal hypotheses to understand politics; evaluations happen
on the basis of norms that are treated as immutable and absolute. On Level 5 (i.e., systematic level) polit-
ical reality is described in abstract and complex terms: it is depicted as a result of interrelated factors and
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viewed in terms of both broader political principles and specific configurations having led to its specific
occurrence. Levels 2 and 4 represent transition states between the three main levels.
Integrative complexity was coded based on the statements that participants wrote individually, immedi-
ately following their discussion in the dyad. The prompt was as follows: “Please take a few minutes to
think about the topic that you just discussed and write down all the thoughts which seem to be relevant
to you”. The coders followed the manual by Baker-Brown et al. (1992; for details on the IC coding
scheme, we refer the reader to the following document available on the Internet: www2.psych.ubc.ca/
~psuedfeld/MANUAL), which distinguishes seven levels of integrative complexity. Level 1 indicates no
differentiation and no integration (i.e., “only one way of looking at the world is considered legitimate”,
Baker-Brown et al., 1992, p. 408); Level 3 indicates differentiation but no integration (“recognition of
alternative perspectives or different dimensions, and the acceptance of these being relevant, legitimate,
justifiable or valid”, Baker-Brown et al., 1992, p. 411); Level 5 indicates differentiation and integration
(“alternative perspectives or dimensions are not only held in focus simultaneously but also are viewed
interactively”, Baker-Brown et al., 1992, p. 414); Level 7 indicates differentiation and higher order inte-
gration (“an overarching viewpoint is presented, which contains an explanation of the organizing princi-
ples [e.g., temporal, causal, theoretical] of the problem or concept”, Baker-Brown et al., 1992, p. 416).
Levels 2, 4, and 6 form intermediate levels.
Participants coded their own emotional experiences during the discussion by listening to the audio
recording of the conversation after the session. Using the mouse paradigm (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998;
Vallacher et al., 1994), they indicated their experiences of their emotions from moment-to-moment on a
continuum from very negative to neutral to very positive. This allowed us to measure the dynamics of
the participants’ experiences over time. The mouse paradigm is a computer program that registers the
position of the mouse on the computer screen every second. While participants saw a black screen, the
arrow of the mouse, and a white circle in the middle of the screen (i.e., neutral emotions), they were
instructed to move the mouse more or less to the left/right when having experienced more or less nega-
tive/positive emotions. An index for negativity/positivity was calculated by the area that arose between
the neutral middle and the mouse when moved to the left/right over the course of time. For analyses, we
used the emotional ratio = ln (index for positivity/index for negativity). (The logarithmic calculus
resulted in a symmetrical distribution from]∞; ∞[ with 0 representing a 1:1-ratio.) This index
accounts for both the valence of the emotions (positive  negative) and the arousal (degree of negativity
and positivity; Feldman Barrett, 1998).
Participants’ ratios of inquiry-to-advocacy behaviors during the conversation were coded second-by-
second after the sessions by trained coders listening to the discussions and using the mouse paradigm
(see above). Different from the emotional coding, which was rated on a continuum, we differentiated
between three categories of behaviors: inquiry utterances (left third of the screen), advocacy utterances
(right third of the screen), neither/nor (middle third of the screen). Specifically, the coders were
instructed to code “inquiry utterances” when hearing a question addressed to the other disputant with
the purpose of better understanding or clarifying the other’s point of view or finding out about the
other’s opinion. The coders were instructed to code “advocacy utterances” when hearing a sentence that
illustrated, explained, or confirmed the person’s own point of view or repeated their point of view. To
train our two coders, we chose five conversations, which both coders individually coded. The coding of
the conversations was compared, and differences were discussed until agreement over a common under-
standing of the coding was reached. For reasons of practicality, the remaining conversations were coded
by one coder individually. If questions arose, they were discussed among coders and with the authors of
the paper. For analyses, we calculated the inquiry-to-advocacy ratio = ln (% of inquiry/% of advocacy).
(Again, the logarithmic calculus resulted in a symmetrical distribution from]∞; ∞[ with 0 represent-
ing a 1:1-ratio.)
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Pilot Study
Using the DCL paradigm, we first conducted a pilot study with 59 dyads. The data from this study were
also used for other analyses (see Kurt, Kugler, Coleman, & Liebovitch, 2014). For the pilot study, we
assumed that over the course of 59 conversations, some would naturally lead to more tractable versus
intractable outcomes. These were designated post hoc and divided into extreme groups: 12 dyads having
written an advanced statement (coded 4 or 5 for political reasoning) and 11 dyads having written no
statement or a poor statement (coded 1 for political reasoning). The two extreme groups were then com-
pared with regard to differences in integrative complexity, positive-to-negative emotional ratio, and
inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral ratio. Henceforth, the analyses refer to the extreme groups.
Method
Given the general procedure of the DCL was described above, only study-specific information is pro-
vided here.
Sample
The pilot study was conducted at a large Northeastern University in the USA. We recruited students via
postings, announcements, and mailing lists. Each participant was paid US$ 25. The 46 individuals form-
ing the 23 dyads of the extreme groups were diverse with respect to age (M = 30.04 years, SD = 8.36),
gender (84.8% female), and ethnicity (4.3% African, 17.4% Asian, 8.7% Latin, 52.2% White, 17.4% other
or not indicated).
Measures
Participants discussed one of the following topics: death penalty, euthanasia, affirmative action, or abor-
tion. Prior to the discussion in the prequestionnaire, we assessed participants’ attitudes on these issues
using published scales. The attitude toward death penalty and euthanasia were assessed by items from
Gallup (death penalty: Jones, 2006; euthanasia: Carroll, 2007), abortion with items from the General
Social Surveys (published by Scott & Schuman, 1988), and affirmative action by various items that were
compiled by Swim and Miller (1999) to a scale.
Extreme groups with respect to intractable versus tractable outcomes were formed based on the genera-
tion of the jointly written statements as well as the level of political reasoning of statements. Interrater
reliability for coding political reasoning (Golec, 2002) was ICC = .95 (discrepancies were resolved after
discussion). Dyads with no statement or a statement coded 1 were considered ending with a more
intractable outcome, dyads with a statement coded 4 or 5 were considered ending with a more tractable
outcome.
Cognitive complexity was assessed by coding individually written paragraphs generated after each ses-
sion for integrative complexity (Baker-Brown et al., 1992; interrater reliability: ICC = .95; discrepancies
were resolved after discussion). Emotional complexity was calculated by the emotional ratio = ln (index
for positivity/index for negativity), based on participants’ self-coding. Behavioral complexity was assessed
by the behavioral ratio = ln (% of inquiry/% of advocacy), based on the coding of trained coders. Initial
interrater agreements for inquiry and advocacy of “training conversations” ranged from ƙ = .69 to
ƙ = .76; differences were discussed until a general agreement was reached and coding was continued
individually.
Data analysis
To test our hypotheses, we compared the levels of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral com-
plexity of the dyads whose conversations resulted in more tractable outcomes with those that
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resulted in more intractable outcomes (i.e., the extreme groups). However, we could not sim-
ply compare the means of all individuals of each extreme group, as our data had a multi-level
structure: the individuals were nested in dyads. Also, our data were measured on different
levels: whereas integrative complexity, positive-to-negative emotional ratios, and inquiry-to-ad-
vocacy behavioral ratios were measured on the individual level, conflict (in)tractability was
assessed on the dyadic level.
For the variables assessed on the individual level, we had to assume that individuals within one dyad
were not independent from each other, which was supported by preliminary analyses showing an agree-
ment within dyads up to ICC(2) = .63 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). An ICC(2) of .63 is considered a large
effect (cf. LeBreton & Senter, 2008) and close to the average agreement reported in the literature (Woehr
et al., 2015), supporting the non-interdependence within our data. If not addressed, the non-interdepen-
dence biases significance tests and may lead to misinterpretation of results (Kenny, Kashy & Cook,
2006).
As suggested by Kenny et al. (2006), we addressed this issue by treating dyads (instead of indi-
viduals) as the unit of analysis. Thus, instead of directly comparing the means of the extreme
groups, we first averaged the individuals’ scores for each dyad (i.e., aggregating the variables on the
level of the dyad), before we compared the average scores of the two groups using t-tests (with
N = 23 dyads).
To aggregate our data on the level of the dyad, we used each dyad’s mean (Kenny et al., 2006). In case
of missing values of one of the individuals, only the value of the other individual was used (missing val-
ues for integrative complexity n = 9 individuals, due to individuals not having written a statement or
statements that were “un-codable”; missing values for positive-to-negative emotional ratios n = 2 indi-
viduals, due to technical problems with the mouse paradigm; missing values for inquiry-to-advocacy
behavioral ratios n = 1 individual, due to one person not having inquired and ln (0) not being defined).
The calculations were conducted in R using: base and stats (R Core Team, 2018ore Team, 2018), car
(Fox & Weisberg, 2011), psych (Revelle, 2018), and compute.es (Del Re, 2013).
Results and Discussion
Supporting our hypotheses, we found significantly different levels of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
complexity when comparing dyads with more tractable outcomes to those with more intractable out-
comes. Dyads having ended their discussions with tractable outcomes versus intractable outcomes
showed: significantly higher levels of integrative complexity, t(21) = 3.14, p = .006, d = 1.27, support-
ing Hypothesis 1; significantly higher positivity-to-negativity emotional ratios, t(21) = 5.75, p < .001,
d = 2.40, supporting Hypothesis 2; and significantly higher inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral ratios, t(21)
= 3.75, p = .001, d = 1.56, supporting Hypothesis 3.
Given that we hypothesized different emotional, cognitive, and behavioral patterns of complexity
between the more and less tractable conversations, we assumed that emotions, cognitions, and behaviors
would be related to each other. Exploratory analyses showed that the level of dyads’ positivity-to-negativ-
ity emotional ratios were significantly positively correlated with their integrative complexity (r = .46, p =
.028, N = 23) and their inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral ratios (r = .44, p = .035, N = 23). The levels of
dyads’ positivity-to-negativity emotional ratios were not significantly correlated with their inquiry-to-ad-
vocacy behavioral ratios (r = .34, p = .109, N = 23), even though the effect was medium (Cohen, 1992),
which might be due to the small sample size.
In sum, individuals ending their discussions with tractable outcomes showed more complexity in
their thinking, feeling and behaving than individuals ending their discussions with intractable out-
comes. However, given that we compared post hoc extreme groups, causal conclusions could not be
drawn.
Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 211–230 219
Kugler and Coleman Moral conflict and complexity
Main Experiment
In our main experiment, we attempted to manipulate different levels of participants’ complexity at the
onset of the conflict discussion in order to influence the subsequent dynamics and outcomes. More
specifically, individuals read a text prior to the discussion in the DCL, which contained basically the same
information, but was written according to the standards of high versus low integrative complexity (see
below). We hypothesized that individuals in the high-complexity versus low-complexity condition (both
individuals of a dyad were assigned to the same condition) would show higher versus lower levels of inte-
grative complexity (manipulation check), positive-to-negative emotional ratios, inquiry-to-advocacy
behavioral ratios during the discussion, and finally, more tractable outcomes.
Method
In addition to the general procedure of the DCL described above, participants’ levels of integrative com-
plexity were manipulated prior to the discussion; also, we assessed levels of integrative complexity in the
prequestionnaire, which allowed us to explore the change in integrative complexity caused by the manip-
ulation and discussion.
Manipulation of integrative complexity
To induce high and low levels of integrative complexity, participants individually read a text about the
topic of the discussion immediately prior to the discussion. While the amount and basic content of the
information were the same in both conditions, the manner in which it was presented was fundamentally
different: It was either written according to the standards of high or of low integrative complexity
(Baker-Brown et al., 1992).
More specifically the texts were structured as follows: Participants were first told that they would be
given background information on the topic of [moral issue] as “it is important to consider different per-
spectives” (high-complexity condition) or “it is important to have a clear perspective” (low-complexity
condition). Second, the legal framework regarding [moral topic] was presented (the text was the same
for both conditions). Third, participants read several points regarding which opinions on the topic divar-
icate: In the high-complexity condition, opposing opinions were differentiated and integrated; in the
low-complexity condition, opposing opinions were contrasted (depending on participant’s view—pro
vs. con—their own opinion was featured and the opposing view was framed as a counterargument).
Thus, we prepared three different texts for each topic: One text for individuals in the high-complexity
condition, one text for individuals in the low-complexity condition holding a pro-opinion and one text
for individuals in the low-complexity condition holding a con-opinion. (Note each dyad consisted of
two individuals with opposing views on a topic.)
Example sentences from the high-complexity condition for the topic euthanasia are (note that the
study was conducted in Germany): “In the Article 1 of the German Basic Law is written: Human dignity
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”... Is dignity violated
if a person suffers a fatal illness and is in great pain? Is dignity violated, if ultimately other people decide
about one’s own life or death?... Regarding the decision to live or to die, an individual’s reasons underly-
ing the potential will to die should be understood and viewed in the light of preserving life.” Example
sentences from the low-complexity manipulation (pro-euthanasia) are: “In the Article 1 of the German
Basic Law is written: Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all
state authority.”... Dignity is violated if a person suffers a fatal illness and is in great pain. This is the case
even if ultimately other people decide about one’s own life or death. Regarding the decision to live or to
die, the individual’s will to die should be respected beyond preserving life.” (Text translated by the
authors.)
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The effects of the manipulation were piloted with 61 individuals: After having read the manipulation-
texts, individuals showed significantly different levels of integrative complexity in a written statement, t
(59) = 2.04, p = .046, d = 0.52.
Sample
We recruited 88 participants (44 dyads) at a large University in Germany, who were paid 20 Euros (one
dyad of originally 45 dyads had to be excluded due to technical problems with the recording). We
recruited students via postings, announcements, and mailing lists. We assigned 22 dyads to each condi-
tion. The sample consisted of 47.7% female, who were M = 24.00 years old (SD = 4.51) and predomi-
nantly (90.9%) German.
Measures
Participants discussed one of the topics: euthanasia, abortion, or punishment of sexual offenders; partici-
pants’ opinions were assessed with the same questions used in the pilot study (punishment of sexual
offenders was a new topic for which items were generated by the authors).
The degree of tractability of outcomes was assessed by whether or not dyads had reached sufficient con-
sensus to write a joint statement. If a statement was written, its level of political reasoning was coded by
trained coders (Golec, 2002; interrater reliability: ICC = .96, discrepancies were resolved after discus-
sion).
Cognitive complexity was assessed twice on the basis of individually written statements: prior to the dis-
cussion in the prequestionnaire and directly after the discussion. The statements were coded for integra-
tive complexity (Baker-Brown et al., 1992; interrater reliability: ICC = .93, discrepancies were resolved
after discussion). Emotional complexity was assessed by the emotional ratio = ln (index for positivity/in-
dex for negativity), based on participants self-coding using the mouse paradigm after the discussion.
Behavioral complexity was assessed by the ratio = ln (% of inquiry/% of advocacy), based on the coding
of trained coders after the discussion. Initial interrater agreements for inquiry and advocacy of “training”
conversations ranged from ƙ = .60 to ƙ = .96; differences were discussed until a general agreement was
reached and coding was continued individually.
Data analysis
To test our hypotheses, we compared the means of the two conditions with respect to differences in the
discussants’ experiences and actions during the conversation (i.e., cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
complexity) as well as the outcomes of the discussion. However, a “simple” comparison of these variables
was not possible, given the multi-level structure of our data: individuals were nested in dyads. Also, our
variables were assessed on different levels: Whereas integrative complexity, positive-to-negative emo-
tional ratio, and inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral ratio was measured on the individual level, conflict (in)-
tractability was assessed on the dyadic level. As described in the Pilot Study, we had to assume non-
interdependence of our data, which was supported by preliminary analyses showing agreement within
dyads up to ICC(2) = .59 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). For the same reasons that were in outlined in the
Pilot Study (see Data analysis), we followed the suggestions by Kenny et al. (2006) and treated dyads as
the unit of analysis. Thus, we first aggregated all variables that were assessed on the individual level on
the level of the dyad by using the means. In case of missing values of one of the individuals, only the
value of the other individual was used (missing values for integrative complexity prior to the discussion
n = 9 individuals, due to individuals not having written a statement or statements that were “un-cod-
able”; missing values for integrative complexity after to the discussion n = 1 individual, due to no state-
ment was written).
Entering all variables on the dyadic level, we compared the two conditions using t-tests and performed
a mediation analysis based on regressions. The calculations were conducted in R: base and stats (R Core
Team, 2018), car (Fox & Weisberg, 2011), psych (Revelle, 2018), and compute.es (Del Re, 2013).
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Mediation Analyses were conducted using PROCESS (Hayes, 2012) for assessing mediations with multi-
ple mediators.
Results and Discussion
To test our hypotheses, we compared the dyads in the high-complexity and low-complexity conditions
regarding their conflict dynamics and outcomes. The actual results of all analyses are provided in
Table 1.
Our manipulation of individuals’ levels of integrative complexity prior to the discussion was successful
in that dyads in the high-complexity condition showed significantly higher levels of integrative complex-
ity after the discussion than in the low-complexity condition. Whereas individuals in the high-complex-
ity condition displayed increases in their levels of integrative complexity from before to after the
discussion, the individuals in the low-complexity condition showed decreases in their levels of integrative
complexity. The change in integrative complexity different significantly between the two conditions. The
cognitive manipulation also had effects on participants’ emotions and behaviors: Individuals in the high-
complexity condition showed significantly higher levels of positive-to-negative emotional ratios and
inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral ratios.
Table 1
Summary of Results for the Main Experiment
Variables
Descriptive data
Test of difference between
the two conditionsM SD N (Dyads)
Integrative complexity after the discussion
(1 = low levels, 7 = high levels)
t(42) = 6.61, p < .001, d = 1.99
Low-complexity condition 2.47 1.24 22
High-complexity condition 4.20 1.09 22
Change in integrative complexity
(IC after the discussion  IC in pretest)
t(41) = 4.27, p < .001, d = 1.30
Low-complexity condition 0.48 1.92 21
High-complexity condition 1.62 1.60 22
Positive-to-negative emotional ratio
ln ((index for positivity)/(index for negativity))
t(42) = 2.05, p = .047, d = 0.62
Low-complexity condition 0.62 2.46 22
High-complexity condition 1.50 1.73 22
Inquiry-to-advocacy ratio
ln ((% of inquiry)/(% of advocacy))
t(42) = 5.49, p < .001, d = 1.66
Low-complexity condition 3.21 1.29 22
High-complexity condition 1.87 0.85 22
Joint position statement
(0 = no, 1 = yes)
v2(1) = 16.50, p < .001, w = 0.61
Low-complexity condition 0.45 0.51 22
High-complexity condition 1.00 0.00 22
Quality of joint position statement if written
(1 = poor, 5 = advanced statement)
t(30) = 3.22, p = .003, d = 0.97
Low-complexity condition 2.10 1.45 10
High-complexity condition 3.59 1.10 22
Note. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) were calculated on the individual level; tests of difference between the two
conditions were calculated on the dyadic level. Change in integrative complexity refers to the change from the pretest to after
the discussion.
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Finally, the manipulation of high versus low complexity was also found to affect the conflict outcomes.
Whereas all dyads in the high-complexity condition wrote a joint position statement, only 45.5% of the
dyads in the low-complexity condition were able to generate a joint statement. The quality of the state-
ments themselves also showed significant differences: In the low-complexity condition, the statements
were rated as more poorly written in terms of political reasoning, in the high-complexity condition the
statements were more advanced in terms of political reasoning.
To test our hypotheses in an overall analysis, we conducted a mediation analysis with three simultane-
ous mediators. The manipulation of low versus high levels of integrative complexity prior to the discus-
sion (i.e., independent variable) positively influenced the level of complexity in participants’ experiences
and behaviors during the discussion (i.e., three simultaneous mediators: integrative complexity, positive-
to-negative emotional ratios, and inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral ratios). The level of complexity in par-
ticipants’ experiences and behaviors in turn positively influenced the tractability of the discussion out-
comes (i.e., the advancement in political reasoning, dependent variable). Using PROCESS (Hayes, 2012)
for assessing mediations with multiple mediators, we found a significant indirect effect. The 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap CI with 5,000 replications did not include zero [0.01, 2.86]).
In additional analyses, we explored the relationships between cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
complexity. We found a significant positive correlation of dyads’ levels of integrative complexity and
positive-to-negative emotional ratio (r = .32, p = .034, N = 44) as well as inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral
ratio (r = .41, p = .006, N = 44). Dyads’ levels of positive-to-negative emotional ratio and inquiry-to-ad-
vocacy behavioral ratio were only marginally positively correlated (r = .29, p = .058, N = 44); even the
though the effect size indicated a medium relationship between the variables (Cohen, 1992), its non-sig-
nificance may have been due to the relatively small sample size.
In sum, our results supported our hypotheses. They showed that not only more/less complex patterns
of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors were associated with more tractable/intractable conflict out-
comes, but also that the level of complexity could be influenced to support more tractable outcomes
from discussions over moral conflicts. The complexity dynamics were significantly influenced by basic
differences in a written text—something people read about sociopolitical topics all the time, for example,
in the media—offering a starting point to enforce more constructive discussions in everyday life.
General Discussion
Summary and Contributions
This paper attempted to empirically address the question, under what conditions do conflicts over
important moral differences go well or go poorly and result in intractable stalemates? It presented two
studies from our Difficult Conversations Lab (DCL), which investigated the proposition that differences
in the underlying cognitive, emotional, and behavioral complexity of the individuals involved would help
account for differences in intractability. Both studies—a pilot study and a main experiment—provided
support for our basic assumption: Conversations between individuals with more complex experiences
and behaviors (i.e., higher levels of integrative complexity, positivity-to-negativity emotional ratios, and
inquiry-to-advocacy behavioral ratios) resulted in more tractable outcomes than those with less com-
plexity. The pilot study found these differences when comparing extreme groups with naturally occurring
tractable versus intractable outcomes, while the main experiment found support by experimentally
inducing different levels of integrative complexity. In the latter, higher levels of integrative complexity
not only affected the outcome of the conflict, but also the complexity of the emotional experiences and
behaviors of the participants during the conflict.
The current studies contribute to theory and research in two main ways. First, they offer a new
methodological paradigm—the DCL paradigm—to study moral conflict in the laboratory, which allows
for the investigation of conflicts over genuine moral differences. Most contemporary research on social
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conflict involves case studies of past events, large surveys of people’s attitudes and perceptions of current
events, or laboratory studies that use games or role plays to simulate conflict (Deutsch & Goldman,
2006). Here we have taken a different approach, as we were interested in studying the moment-to-mo-
ment experiences and actions of people engaged in genuine moral conflicts (Gottman has used a similar
method to study marital conflict; Gottman et al., 2002; Gottman et al., 1999). Measuring the dynamics
of conflicts over time is a challenge, but the results of our studies suggest that it is promising to explore
more sophisticated ways to investigate differences and changes in temporal dynamics.
Second, the studies focused on differences in the complexity of underlying patterns of cognitions,
emotions, and behaviors associated with more and less intractable conflicts, rather than singling out any
one of these aspects. This idea has been proposed by the dynamical system model of intractable conflict
(Coleman et al., 2007; Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013), which suggests that the patterns of parties’ percep-
tions, experiences, and behaviors leading to intractability differ from those leading to tractability with
respect to their complexity. The current studies offer a test of this proposition. Typically, research on
intractable conflicts focuses on investigating specific aspects of their issues, individuals, relationships, or
contexts that drive more recalcitrant outcomes (Coleman, 2003; Coleman et al., 2009; Kriesberg, 2005).
The current studies contribute to theory and research by moving beyond mere testing of discreet compo-
nents of intractability, and providing a more basic and parsimonious understanding of their underlying
dynamics (Coleman et al., 2007; Vallacher et al., 2010).
Limitations and Future Research
The studies had several limitations. First, we studied 20-minute conflict discussions between two stran-
gers. Even though we found evidence of different underlying dynamics between conflicts with more
tractable versus intractable outcomes, the conflicts were brief, not involving ongoing relationships. The
DCL could be used in future studies for capturing longer discussions or even conflicts between people
and groups in ongoing relationships (Gottman, Murray et al., 2002).
Second, we manipulated differences in levels of integrative complexity by providing information about
the topic of discussion, written according to the standards of high versus low levels of integrative com-
plexity. Even though we believed the manipulation induced a modicum of experimental realism
(Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982), it is possible that the effects may have also been due to demand char-
acteristics, where the manipulation shaped expectations for the conversations. Different types of manipu-
lations should be tested in future studies. For example, different levels of integrative complexity could be
induced by presenting texts about topics unrelated to the focus of discussion, by conflict-facilitation
techniques like the constructive controversy (Johnson et al., 2006), or through interactive discussion
structures (Brodbeck et al., 2020). Furthermore, differences in the complexity of participants’ emotions
or behaviors could be manipulated in addition to their cognitions, which could have implications for the
duration and sustainability of the induced effects.
Third, in these studies, we coded cognitions on the basis of a paragraph written by participants after
the discussion, while emotions were coded by asking participants to recall their moment-to-moment
experiences during the discussion while listening to a recording of the discussion. Both the written para-
graph and the recall of emotions could potentially have been influenced by the actual outcome of the dis-
cussion. Future research should seek to refine our coding methods by, for example, having cognitions
and emotions coded by external coders over time similar to our coding of inquiry and advocacy. For
example, emotions could be coded by the coding system SPAFF (Coan & Gottman, 2007) or software
solutions for facial recognition (e.g., https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/face).
Also, researchers have recently attempted to code integrative complexity from ongoing conversations
(Park & DeShon, 2018) or through software solutions (Conway, Conway, Gornick, & Houck, 2014). If
all variables were coded by external coders or computer software, the problem of combining coding from
different sources (i.e., external coders vs. participants) that we faced in our research could be avoided.
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Finally, even though our measures of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors were a reflection of the
ongoing dynamics of the conflict or otherwise influenced by the dynamics, we chose not to apply dynam-
ical and non-linear methods of analyses at this stage. Rather, we tried to capture the dynamics while still
applying more standard methods of analyses widely used in psychological research. Future research could
focus on tracking and analyzing non-linear analyses over time, in order to investigate the trajectories of
interactions between cognitions, emotions, and behaviors within and between individuals. For example,
such analysis could include focusing on differences in the initial starting conditions of conflicts, which
have found to be crucial for subsequent social interactions (Gottman, Swanson et al., 2002; Liebovitch
et al., 2008; Vallacher et al., 2013).
Implications for Practice
One practical implication of our research is to highlight the importance of providing disputants in con-
flict with information that is not black-and-white but reveals different points of views on complex issues
and describes them in relation to each other. Such approaches are already in use by many dialogue facili-
tation groups (e.g., by the National Issues Forum, see www.nifi.org). Furthermore, the current findings
could encourage media, political decision makers, conflict interveners etc., to carefully consider how dif-
ficult topics are communicated in terms of the level of complexity. The results also suggest that conflict
interventions increasing disputants’ levels of complexity (integrative complexity, complexity in emo-
tional experience, or in their behavior) could be beneficial for improving conflict processes and out-
comes. Thus, interventions could be designed and validated that specifically tackle individuals or groups
levels of cognitive, emotional, and/or behavioral complexity (cf. Brodbeck et al., 2020).
Conclusion
The research presented in this paper represents a first foray into what we hope to be a long-term program
of research. Our goal is not to oversimplify such conflicts, but to better understand their essence in the
context of their complexity.
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